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CRIMINAL LAW-BORDERING ON UNREASONABLENESS?: THE THIRD
CIRCUIT AGAIN EXPANDS THE BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION IN
UrinD STA TES V. HDE
I. INTRODUCTION
Your client, a young professional, just returned from a well-deserved
tropical vacation. Upon disembarking from his flight at Philadelphia In-
ternational Airport, customs officers approach and, without any particular
suspicion, begin questioning him. When he asks why he is being ques-
tioned, the officers respond that he simply fit their profile: a young, Afri-
can-American male, travelling alone from the tropics. After answering
some questions, the officers dismiss him. He proceeds to baggage claim.
When his bags do not appear, he approaches an airline employee to re-
port them missing. Here, the officials who had opened his luggage arrest
him, after finding something he should not have possessed-maybe drugs,
maybe money, maybe just an expensive gift for his wife. Your client wants
to know if the court will exclude the evidence in his upcoming trial. Im-
mediately, Fourth Amendment principles of reasonableness, privacy,
search warrants and probable cause enter your mind. After your client
departs, you begin researching and must confront the "border search
exception."
One of the fundamental protections concerning the framers of the
United States Constitution involves the right of freedom from governmen-
tal searches and seizures.' The Fourth Amendment to the United States
1. Harris J. Yale, Beyond the Border of Reasonableness: Exports, and the Border
Search Exception, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 733, 739-43 (1983). Yale details the passage of
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights in the context of the concerns of the day.
Id. He notes that the origin of the Fourth Amendment has been traced back
through English history to the issuance of general warrants in the early fourteenth
century and writs of assistance in the seventeenth century. Id. at 739 (footnotes
omitted). As the attitude of the colonists changed, these warrants became a point
of contention among the colonists and after the Declaration of Independence,
seven states drafted constitutional provisions condemning general warrants and
affirming the right of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at
740-41. Due to logistical problems, the drafters did not propose the Bill of Rights
at the time of the Constitution. Id. Consequently, the absence of Fourth Amend-
ment protections represented a large reason why the Constitution barely survived a
vote. Id. Three drafters refused to sign it and two states would not ratify it. Id. at
741-42. Shortly thereafter, however, the drafters proposed amendments to the
Constitution, including the current version of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 742-
43. For a more complete discussion of the history of the Fourth Amendment and
the passage of the Constitution, see N.B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 22 (1970
ed.); see also Note, Search and Seizure at the Border-The Border Search, 21 RUTGERS L.
REV. 513, 514-15 (1967) (discussing general warrants and writs of assistance).
(835)
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Constitution 2 protects individuals against "unreasonable"3 searches and
seizures. 4 Whether a search fulfills the "reasonable" requirement depends
on the specific facts of each case. 5 Generally, courts require a warrant to
meet the definition of "reasonable."6 Probable cause must support the
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
3. What courts call "reasonable" or "unreasonable" depends on the totality of
the circumstances surrounding both search and seizure as well as the nature of the
search and seizure. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537
(1985) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-42 (1985)).
4. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947); see alsoJason J. Thomp-
son, Note, Michigan Department of State Police v Sitz: Room for Sobriety Checkpoints
Under the Fourth Amendment, 1991 DET. C.L. REV. 859, 861 n.12-13 (discussing un-
derlying purpose of Bill of Rights, in general, and Fourth Amendment, in particu-
lar). "The stern protection of the Fourth Amendment sharply curtails the
government's curiosity about us." Roger Rosenblatt, The Bill of Rights, LIFE, Fall
1991, Special Issue, at 9. Rosenblatt also discusses the dilemmas that future tech-
nology, never contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution and drafters of the
Bill of Rights, pose for today's society. Id. "In coming years the Fourth Amend-
ment will have a big role in the theater of the courtroom as the nation realizes just
how precious - and vulnerable - is the promise of security from invasion by the
state." Id.
5. Montoya de Hernande, 473 U.S. at 537 ("What is reasonable depends upon
all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the
search or seizure itself."); see also Yale, supra note 1, at 750 ("[A] search that is
unreasonable is one where probable cause is absent."). The term "reasonableness"
under the border search exception lacks a "comprehensive definition or ...
mechanical application." United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983) (quoting United States v. Guadalupe-Garza,
421 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1970)). Rather, "[t]he scope of the intrusion, the man-
ner of its conduct, and the justification for its initiation must all be considered in
determining whether a search comports with reasonableness." Id.
6. United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that "'war-
rantless searches are presumptively unreasonable' ") (quoting Horton v. Califor-
nia, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990)); see also Torres v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
442 U.S. 465, 471 (1979) ("[A] warrant is normally a prerequisite to a search un-
less exigent circumstances make compliance with this requirement impossible.")
(quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978)).
The Supreme Court has, on countless occasions, claimed that the Fourth
Amendment specifically contains a warrant requirement. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390;
see, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 445-55 (1971); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948); see also Thompson, supra note 4, at 862-63
(noting that Court often points to "warrant clause" of Fourth Amendment as re-
quiring warrant for reasonable search). But see Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment
First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 761 (1994) (arguing that words of Amend-
ment itself do not require probable cause for all searches without warrants).
In attempting to analyze unreasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and
what circumstances may justify departing from the warrant requirement, Justice
Frankfurter stated that the words of the Fourth Amendment:
are not just a literary composition. They are not to be read as they might
be read by a man who knows English but has no knowledge of the history
836
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issuance of such warrant.7 Over the years, however, the United States
Supreme Court has engrafted certain exceptions upon the probable cause
requirement.8 In these limited situations, the governmental interest in
that gave rise to the words. The clue to the meaning and scope of the
Fourth Amendment is John Adams' characterization of Otis' argument
against search by the police that "American independence was then and
there born." . . . One cannot wrench "unreasonable searches" from the
text and context and historic content of the Fourth Amendment. It was
the answer of the Revolutionary statesmen to the evils of searches without
warrants and searches with warrants unrestricted in scope. Both were
deemed "unreasonable." Words must be read with the gloss of the expe-
rience of those who framed them. Because the experience of the framers
of the Bill of Rights was so vivid, they assumed that it would be carried
down the stream of history and that their words would receive the signifi-
cance of the experience to which they were addressed - a significance
not to be found in the dictionary. When the Fourth Amendment out-
lawed "unreasonable searches" and then went on to define the very re-
stricted authority that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could
give, the framers said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a
search is "unreasonable" unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only ex-
ceptions justified by absolute necessity.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69-70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
7. Yale, supra note 1, at 734. For the text of the Fourth Amendment, see supra
note 2.
8. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (recognizing border search
exception). The total number of exceptions varies depending on the source con-
sulted. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 4, at 865 n.34 (noting that at least five and
as many as seven exceptions have been identified). Traditional, well-recognized
exceptions from the Supreme Court include: (1) the automobile exception, Cali-
fornia v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982);
(2) the arrest-in-a-public-place exception, United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976); (3) the search-incident-to-a-valid-arrest exception, Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969); (4) the plain-view exception, Horton, 496 U.S. 128; (5) the
hot-pursuit exception, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); (6) the exigent
circumstances exception, Id.; (7) the border search exception, United States v.
Boyd, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Hyde, 37 F.3d 116; (8) the consent exception,
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); and (9) the stop-and-frisk excep-
tion, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Elizabeth P. Marsh, Does Evidence Law Matter
in Criminal Suppression Hearings?, 25 Loy. LA. L. REv. 987, 993 n.21 (1992); see also
Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth
Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REv. 473, 521 (1991) (listing 14 exceptions, adding regu-
lated industries and independent source exceptions); Kenneth C. Haas, The
Supreme Court Enters the 'Jar Wars": Drug Testing, Public Employees, and the Fourth
Amendment, 94 Dicy- L. REv. 305, 371 (1990) (listing numerous exceptions); Di-
anne M. Lodge, What Is Left of the Fourth Amendment, NoRWOOD BULLETIN, July 26,
1994, at 5 (discussing effect of exceptions). Some recent developments under
Supreme Court jurisprudence, which may also be classified as exceptions to the
warrant requirement, include: (1) the inventory exception, Florida v. Wells, 495
U.S. 1 (1990); (2) roadblock searches, Michigan Dep't. of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444 (1990); (3) searches where officers rely, in good faith, on a statute defin-
ing police power later found unconstitutional, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340
(1987); (4) drug testing, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989); and (5) inevitable discovery, Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). Id. For
a detailed discussion of many of these individual exceptions, see Russell W. Gallo-
way, Jr., Basic Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 737 (1992).
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conducting a warrantless search of a person outweighs that individual's
right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 9
One of the major exceptions to the probable cause requirement in-
volves the so-called border search exception. This exception holds cus-
toms officials exempt from the probable cause requirement when
searching persons entering the United States. 10 The Supreme Court has
upheld the reasonableness of border searches simply because it occurs at
the border.11 Due to this virtually unlimited right to search, the only limi-
tation ordinarily focuses on the reasonableness of the search.12
9. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 118 (citing Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537) ("The
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by 'balancing its
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.' ").
10. Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007 (1968).
Since the first border search statute was enacted in 1789, customs
officials have been authorized to stop and examine any vehicle, person,
or baggage arriving in the United States on suspicion that merchandise is
concealed which is subject to duty or which cannot legally be imported
into the United States.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also Daniel L. Cullum, The Fourth Amendment and
Maritime Drug Searches: Is There a "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy" on Vessels at Sea?,
1994 U. CH. LEGAL F. 367 (1994) ("Border searches are authorized by Title 19,
Section 482 of the United States Code... which grants Customs officers plenary
power to inspect individuals and their belongings at the border." (footnotes
omitted)).
The courts have also expanded the border search exception through the de-
velopment of the "extended" border search doctrine, which permits searches to
occur well after the border crossing occurs. United States v. Caicedo-Guarnizo,
723 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Espericeata-Reyes, 631 F.2d
616, 619 (9th Cir. 1980). Because an extended border search involves a greater
spatial and temporal distance from the border than a search at the functional
equivalent of the border, it must be justified by at least a "reasonable suspicion" of
criminal activity. United States v. Delgado, 810 F.2d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 1987) (cit-
ing United States v. Alfonso, 759 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1985)); United States v.
Barbin, 743 F.2d 256, 261 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Richards, 638 F.2d 765,
772 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981)).
11. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) ("That searches made
at the border, pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself
by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are
reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by
now, require no extended demonstration."); see also United States v. Scheer, 600
F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding border search of luggage as "routine" and needing
no degree of suspicion).
12. Note, Search and Seizure at the Border-The Border Search, supra note 1, at
516-17. But see United States v. St. Prix, 672 F.2d 1077, 1083 n.10 (2d Cir.) ("The
'border search' exception does not justify searches of homes or business establish-
ments." (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 992 (1982).
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The concept of the border search now includes searches at "func-
tional equivalents"' 3 of the United States border. 14 Furthermore, the
13. The "functional equivalent" of the United States border represents "the
place where virtually everyone searched has just come from the border." HarrietJ.
Sims, Recent Development, 65 GEo. L.J. 1641, 1647-48 (1977); see also United
States v. Alvarez-Gonzalez, 542 F.2d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 1976) (discussing functional
equivalent); United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1974) (en
banc) (analyzing case law defining functional equivalent), aff'd, 422 U.S. 916
(1975); R.V. Seep, Annotation, What Constitutes Functional Equivalent of Border for
Purpose of Border Exception to Requirements of Fourth Amendment, 94 A.L.R. FED. 372
(1994) (analyzing cases in which courts expressly considered what constitutes
"functional equivalent" of border in context of border search exception).
Airports, almost universally considered "functional equivalents," have also
been characterized as "critical zones" based on the nature of their function,
namely to transport travelers. Sanford L. Dow, Airport Security, Terrorism, and the
Fourth Amendment: A Look Back and a Step Forward, 58J. AtR L. & CoM. 1149, 1183-84
(1993). Thus, many courts treat airports like national borders. Id.; see also
Jonathan L. Miller, Search and Seizure of Air Passengers and Pilots: The Fourth Amend-
ment Takes Flight, 22 TRANsP. L.J. 199, 211 (1994) (noting uniqueness of aviation
because air provides only means of travel for international gateways at landlocked,
inner continental locations). Dow further analyzes, in some detail, how courts ap-
ply the border search exception to airports. Dow, supra, at 1184. Even among
airport searches, courts differentiate between searches in secured boarding areas
and those in general, undefined areas. Id. at 1186. Frequently, the searches in
designated boarding areas only require mere suspicion, while those in the general
area demand reasonable suspicion. Id.
14. United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116, 120 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The Supreme
Court has held that valid warrantless border searches may take place at the 'func-
tional equivalent' of an international border or an 'extension' thereof."); see also
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973) (stating that in cer-
tain situations courts permit border searches at functional equivalents of interna-
tional border); see generally, Judith B. Ittig, The Rites of Passage: Border Searches and
the Fourth Amendment, 40 TENN. L. REv. 329, 329 (1973) (noting that border
searches "are not limited to searches at an international boundary though they
must have a relation to it").
Courts have not always defined the border in this manner. "Originally, the
border was thought to extend only from an arriving ship to the streets of the port
city in which it docked .... Sims, supra note 13, at 1647. In the early 1970s,
courts began employing the "elastic border" concept, "recognizing that in some
instances it is impossible to search exactly at the border." Id. (citing United States
v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974);
United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121
(1969); Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317, 324 (5th Cir. 1965)). The Almeida
Court significantly restricted the "elastic border" concept with its creation of the
"functional equivalent" standard. Almeida, 413 U.S. at 272-73; cf. Gregory L.
Waples, From Bags to Body Cavities: The Law of Border Search, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 53,
56-57 (1974) (recognizing Almeida decision but continuing to define border "by
dynamic parameters dependent upon the facts of each case, instead of by a static,
linear front"). The Eleventh Circuit has summarized the essence of the functional
equivalent:
A search within the border may also be justified as a border search requir-
ing no warrant nor any suspicion if there is reasonable certainty that the
object or person searched has just crossed the border, there has been no
time or opportunity for the object to have changed materially since the
time of crossing, and the search is conducted at the earliest practicable
point after the border was crossed .... This type of search is justified
5
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United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, including the Third Circuit, have
expanded the border search to include searches of outgoing travelers.' 5
Recently, the Third Circuit held that "routine customs searches of persons
and their belongings without probable cause as they leave the Virgin Is-
lands for the continental United States are not unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment."1 6
Presently, one can differentiate among several distinct types of
searches. 17 For purposes of this Casebrief, the only important distinction
to note involves that between "routine" and "non-routine" searches.18
This distinction entails a close scrutiny of the duration, extent and scope
under the border-search doctrine because it is in essence no different
than a search conducted at the border; the reason for allowing such a
search to take place other than at the actual physical border is the practi-
cal impossibility of requiring the subject searched to stop at the physical
border.
United States v. Niver, 689 F.2d 520, 526 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Almeida, 413 U.S.
at 272; United States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1363-64 (11th Cir. 1982)).
15. United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1991); see also United
States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 834 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that routine border
search exception applied to container, located in custom area and marked for
shipment abroad), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981). Courts have referred to
searches of outgoing travelers as "reverse border searches." Erica S. Perl, United
States v. Rodriguez-Rios: The Fifth Circuit Says "Adios!" to the "Exculpatory No"Doctrine,
69 TUL. L. REV. 621 (1994); Abraham Abramovsky, Money-Laundering and Narcotics
Prosecution, 54 FoRDHAM L. REv. 471, 485 (1986). For a more complete discussion
of the application of the border search exception to outgoing searches, see infra
notes 93-101, 116-126 & 148-156 and accompanying text.
16. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 117. For a detailed discussion of this decision, see infra
notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
17. Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 1012-18.
Some of these differences arise in the manner of the search others stem from the
length of the search and still other differences occur in the object or area of the
person searched. Id. One can identify at least four types of searches: examinations
of identification papers; searches of baggage, vehicle and/or clothing; intrusive
personal searches; and extended border searches. Id. at 1014-18. The type of
search conducted necessarily affects the court's analysis of its reasonableness. Id.
at 1013.
18. Id. Examples of "routine" searches include a brief roadside stop to check
identification and a pat-down or frisk search for weapons, drugs or both. Id.
"Non-routine" searches commonly pertain to detentions of extended duration,
body cavity searches or both. Id. Disagreement exists among courts over these
broad generalizations. For example, in People v. Luna, 535 N.E.2d 1305 (N.Y.
1989), the court held that, under New York law, a pat-down search of a person
crossing an international border required "some" level of suspicion, but a luggage
search requires no suspicion. Luna, 535 N.E.2d at 1306-09. But see United States v.
Sanders, 35 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that only strip searches and body
cavity searches constitute non-routine searches). The court, in reaching this deci-
sion, noted some varying interpretations of the level of intrusiveness of particular
searches and how different courts view them. Luna at 1306-08; see also United
States v. Forde, 30 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that search consisting of rip-
ping off soles of shoes after detecting thick soles and glue constitutes routine
search), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 526 (1994); United States v. Grotke, 702 F.2d 49, 52
(2d Cir. 1983) (holding that search of cowboy boots only results in minimal intru-
sion and thus, requires no reasonable suspicion).
840 [Vol. 40: p. 835
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of the particular search. 19 The significance of this distinction in relation
to the border search exception and what it means to a practitioner is dis-
cussed in detail below.20
This Casebrief discusses the development of the border search excep-
tion in both United States jurisprudence generally and within the Third
Circuit specifically. Part II summarizes the development of the border
search exception by the Supreme Court.2 1 Part III begins with a brief
analysis of how other circuit courts have applied and interpreted the bor-
der search exception. 22 Part III also outlines the Third Circuit's historical
treatment of the border search exception, focusing on recent decisions
applying the exception and on customs searches involving the Virgin Is-
lands.2 3 Part IV then critically analyzes the Third Circuit's most recent
A recent decision in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of New York notes that "[a] strip search, regardless of how professionally and cour-
teously conducted, is an embarrassing and humiliating experience." Johnson v.
Harron, No. 91-CV-1460, 1995 WL 319943, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 1995) (quoting
Daugherty v. Campbell, 33 F.3d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1994)). In the context of a
border search, the Harron court stated that "[b] efore a border official may insist
upon [a strip search], he [or she] should have a suspicion of illegal concealment
that is based upon something more than the border crossing, and the suspicion
should be substantial enough to make the search a reasonable exercise of author-
ity." Id.
19. See, e.g., Arthur J. Kyriazis & Harry M. Caldwell, Unchecked Discretion, The
Buck Stops Here: Is There a Fourth Amendment at the International Borders of the United
States?, 14 WHiTrIER L. Rxv. 613 (1993) (characterizing "routine" versus "non-rou-
tine" searches in context of incoming searches as essentially question of level of
government intrusion, but noting no clear line exists in outgoing searches).
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly enumerated the fac-
tors that render a border search routine, the courts of appeals examine
the degree of intrusiveness involved in a particular search when distin-
guishing between a routine and nonroutine search. For example, nonin-
trusive searches of persons and searches of luggage, personal effects, and
vehicles qualify as routine border searches. Additionally, although the
Court has declined to decide what standard, if any, would govern nonrou-
tine border searches such as strip searches, body cavity searches, or X-ray
examinations, the courts generally agree that reasonable suspicion will
justify strip searches and X-ray examinations, but that a higher level of
suspicion is needed to justify body cavity searches.
Greg Knopp, et al. Project: Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994, 83 GEO. LJ. 692, 749-50 (1995)
(footnotes omitted); see also United States v.Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291 (7th Cir.
1993) ("Routine border inspections are those that do not pose a serious invasion
of privacy and that do not embarrass or offend the average traveler [sic].") (citing
United States v. Dorsey, 641 F.2d 1213, 1216 (7th Cir. 1981)).
20. For a discussion of the significance of non-routine and routine searches as
it relates to the border search exception and what it means to the practitioner, see
infra notes 59, 76-82, 124-33 & 153-59 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the development of the border search exception by
the Supreme Court, see infra notes 28-86 and accompanying text.
22. For an analysis of other circuit courts' interpretation of the border search
exception, see infra notes 87-108 and accompanying text.
23. For a complete discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of the border
search exception, see infra notes 109-42 and accompanying text.
1995]
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statements regarding the border search exception and how such state-
ments may affect individual freedoms in the future.2 4 This section also
examines the history of the Virgin Islands and its relationship with the
United States mainland.2 5 Part V opens by describing what a practitioner
in the Third Circuit must do when facing the border search exception.2 6
Finally, part V concludes by considering the future of the border search
exception and how far courts may expand it.
2 7
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION
The border search exception is "as old as the Fourth Amendment
itself."'28 The Supreme Court formally recognized this exception as early
as 1886, in Boyd v. United States.29 The circumstances facing the Boyd Court
involved the allegedly fraudulent importation of plate glass into the port
of New York.30 In interpreting the applicable customs regulation,3 1 the
Court noted that the government has authorized seizures of illegally im-
24. For a critical analysis of the Third Circuit's most recent statements regard-
ing the border search exception and their effects on individual freedoms, see infra
notes 143-79 and accompanying text.
25. For a complete discussion of the history of the Virgin Islands and its rela-
tionship with the United States mainland, see infra notes 182-90 and accompany-
ing text.
26. For a discussion of what a practitioner must do when facing the border
search exception in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 193-95 and accompanying
text.
27. For a discussion of the future of the border search exception, see infra
notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
28. United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116, 118 (3rd. Cir. 1994) (quoting United
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977)).
29. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
30. Id. at 617-18; see also Yale, supra note 1, at 743 ("The border search excep-
tion traces its judicial genesis directly to the Supreme Court's decision in Boyd v.
United States."). The district attorney filed an information against the owners of the
glass, seizing said glass pursuant to the twelfth section of the "Act to amend the
customs revenue laws" passed on June 22, 1874. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 616. The court
noted that the case involved "a very grave question of constitutional law, involving
the personal security, and privileges and immunities of the citizen ...." Id. at 618.
31. The district attorney relied upon the twelfth section of the "Act to amend
the customs revenue laws" passed on June 22, 1874. Id. at 617. The twelfth section
declared that:
[A]ny owner, importer, consignee, etc., who shall, with intent to defraud
the revenue, make, or attempt to make, any entry of imported merchan-
dise, by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, affidavit, letter, or pa-
per, or by means of any false statement, written or verbal, or who shall be
guilty of any wilful act or omission by means whereof the United States
shall be deprived of the lawful duties, or any portion thereof, accruing
upon the merchandise, or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to
in such invoice, affidavit, letter, paper or statement, or affected by such
act or omission, shall for each offense be fined in any sum not exceeding
$5000 nor less than $50, or be imprisoned for any time not exceeding two
years, or both; and, in addition to such fine, such merchandise shall be
forfeited.
[Vol. 40: p. 835
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ported items "from the commencement of the government."3 2 The Boyd
Court reasoned that because the customs statute of 1789 "was passed by
the same Congress that proposed for adoption the original amendments
to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did not re-
gard searches and seizures of this kind as 'unreasonable,' and they are not
embraced within the prohibition of the amendment."3 3 The Court ulti-
mately rejected the constitutionality of this customs statute because the
Court reasoned that the statute's compulsory production of invoices vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness and the Fifth
Amendment right of freedom from self-incrimination.3 4
Since Boyd, however, courts have almost universally accepted this his-
torical justification for border searches.3 5 More recent judicial justifica-
32. Id. at 623. The Court also noted that the act of July 31, 1789, (1 Stat. 29,
43), contained provisions to this effect. Id.
33. Id. at 623. Most commentators to address the issue agree with the Boyd
historical justification. See, e.g.,Jules D. Barnett, A Report On Search and Seizure at the
Border (Customs Problems), 1 Am. CRiM. L.Q. 36, 39 (Aug. 1963) ("Thus we see the
rare instance of a fact situation, the Constitutional interpretation of which was
authoritatively announced by the draftsmen as a specific reason for the very or-
ganic law in issue."). At least one commentator, however, looks with disfavor at the
historical justification, noting "if Justice Bradley [in Boyd] was correct that the
Framers believed warrantless searches of incoming vessels were reasonable, this
belief must have been based upon something more than the nature of the search."
Yale, supra note 1, at 749 (citation omitted). In evaluating Boyd and its progeny,
Yale argues that the Framers' belief must have rested "upon the circumstances of
the search." Id. He then concludes that the first Congress implicitly adopted an
"exigent circumstances" doctrine, which would excuse the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement, but not probable cause. Id. at 749-50 (emphasis added); see
also O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 997 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting
border search exception constitutes exigent circumstances exception). "[B]y de-
claring the basis of the border search exception to be historical, and not exigent,
in nature, the reasonableness of a border search in nearly all circumstances,
whether exigent or not, and whether there is probable cause or not, is accepted as
fact." Yale, supra note 1, at 750 (citation omitted).
34. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631-35, 638. The Boyd Court stated that a cardinal rule of
the courts "is never to decree a discovery which might tend to convict the party of a
crime, or to forfeit his property." Id. at 631. Any compulsory discovery compelling
an individual to produce the very evidence that leads to his conviction "is contrary
to the principles of a free government." Id. at 631-32. In this context, the Boyd
Court noted the "intimate relation" between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
Id. at 633. The Court stated that the amendments:
throw great light on each other. For the 'unreasonable searches and
seizures' condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made
for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself,
which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and com-
pelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,' which is
condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to
what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
Id.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (reaffirming Boyd
analysis); United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116, 119 (3rd Cir. 1994) (citing Boyd);
Yale, supra note 1, at 744 (remarking that Supreme Court noted juxtaposition of
19951 CASEBRIEF 843
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tions for the border search have included: (1) the war on drugs,3 6 (2) the
less intrusive nature of border searches, 37 (3) the lack of stigma resulting
from border searches,3 8 and (4) mere practicality.3 9 In addition to these
judicial justifications, Congress provides at least one express statutory ex-
planation for application of the border search exception.
40
passing import duty regulations in July, 1789 and Bill of Rights two months later
"to be the Framers' imprimatur on the reasonableness of warrantless searches of
ships and vessels by customs officials"); cf. Note, Border Searches and the Fourth
Amendment, supra note 10, at 1011 (citing three reasons why historical justification
does not work).
First, the legislators may have passed the customs statute of 1789 without
considering fully the applicability to border searches of the moral posi-
tion to which they were about to commit the community in drafting the
fourth amendment. Second, the community's standards of reasonable-
ness may have changed over time. And third, changes in the underlying
facts may have made unreasonable a search which would have been rea-
sonable by the same standards in 1789.
Id.; Galloway, supra note 8, at 760 (noting that in light of recent developments,
border search exception appears to fit within special needs doctrine, with special
need being to prevent importation of harmful items); Ittig, supra note 14, at 333
(arguing that "the historical argument based on continuity of legislative intent can
fully apply only to the first customs law").
36. United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136, 143 (3d Cir. 1991); see Note,
Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 10, at 1011 (noting vital na-
tional interest in preventing illegal entry and smuggling goods, particularly narcot-
ics); see also Sims, supra note 13, at 1643 (listing "three drug-related justifications:
the government's interest in protecting citizens from illegal drugs, the likelihood
of smuggling attempts at the border and the difficulty of detecting drug viola-
tions"). In fact, as early as 1963, one commentator stated:
[With the present magnitude and scope of the smuggling problem (with
emphasis on narcotics), any attack upon the validity of the presently con-
strued rules and regulations pertaining to border search and seizure is a
matter of great concern to the existence and very safe-being of the resi-
dents and government of the United States of America, and should be
guarded against with eternal and continuous vigilance both on the fac-
tual, and legal and judicial levels.
Barnett, supra note 33, at 37.
37. Sims, supra note 13, at 1643.
38. Id.
39. Yale, supra note 1, at 752. Yale observes that courts have justified the bor-
der search exception from a practical standpoint. Id. The practicality surrounding
the exception "enables customs officials to effectively carry out their duties of
preventing contraband from entering the country and collecting duties where ap-
propriate." Id. (citing United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969)). Yale further argues that public policy requires a
constitutionally permissible technique allowing customs officials to achieve these
goals. Id. Yale notes that the Glaziou court has "argued that no investigatory tech-
nique, other than that utilized by customs officials under the aegis of the border
search exception, would achieve any, let alone acceptable, results." Id. (citing
Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8).
40. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b) (1982). Section 5317(b) deals with the smuggling of
currency and reads, in pertinent part: "[f] or purposes of ensuring compliance with
the requirements of [the currency smuggling statute], a customs officer may stop
and search, at the border and without a search warrant, ... any person entering or
departing from the United States." Id.
[Vol. 40: p. 835
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In United States v. Carroll,41 a prohibition-era case, the Court examined
the warrantless seizure of intoxicating liquors from the defendants' auto-
mobile as they travelled from Detroit to Grand Rapids. 42 Although the
Court determined that applicable statutes permitted warrantless searches
for contraband goods, the court cautioned that it would be "intolerable
and unreasonable" if all persons lawfully using the highways faced such
searches. 43 Chief Justice Taft, in dicta often cited by later courts, stated
that warrantless searches of persons within the country must adhere to
Fourth Amendment requirements. 44
The Court in Boyd and Carroll provided the basic foundations and lim-
itations for the border search exception. 45 Boyd applied the border search
exception to incoming travellers and goods, while Carroll attempted to de-
fine the limits of the exception by stating it did not apply to interstate
travellers. 46 For years, courts have freely applied the exception to searches
41. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
42. Id. at 134. In September of 1921, federal prohibition agents, acting un-
dercover, set up a proposed sale of illegal liquors with three men. Id. at 135. On
the night of the supposed delivery, the three men did not show up. Id. In October
of the same year, while patrolling their normal route between Grand Rapids and
Detroit, the agents saw the car of one of the principles in the attempted September
smuggling operation travelling from Grand Rapids. Id. The agents attempted to
follow the car, but lost its trail. Id. In December, they again saw the car travelling
from Detroit to Grand Rapids. Id. This time, the government agents stopped and
searched the automobile, finding 68 bottles of whiskey. Id. at 136.
43. Id. at 154. The Carroll Court found the distinction between legal and
illegal warrantless searches involved probable cause to search. Id. at 156. The
Court believed that this rule fulfilled the guaranty of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must
be used, and when properly supported by affidavit and issued after judi-
cial approval protects the [search]. In cases where seizure is impossible
except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril
unless he can show the court probable cause.
Id.
44. Id. at 154. The specific language states that:
[I]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were
authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and
thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience
and indignity of [a warrantless] search. Travellers may be so stopped in
crossing an international boundary because of national self protection
reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as enti-
tled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully
brought in. But those lawfully within the country... have a right to free passage
without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official author-
ized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contra-
band or illegal merchandise.
Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added). "One commentator has noted that this dicta be-
came a self-fulfilling prophecy." Yale, supra note 1, at 745 (citing J.W. HALL, JR.,
SEARcH AND SEIZURE § 13.3 n.9 (1982)).
45. Note, Search and Seizure at the Border - The Border Search, supra note 1, at
515.
46. United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116, 118-20 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting Boyd
held border search exception constitutional and Carroll established balancing test
used in applying exception).
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occurring at the border, but have cautiously applied it to more attenuated
border searches. 4
7
The Supreme Court revisited the justifications for the border search
exception in a series of cases during the 1970s. 48 Relying largely on the
rationale of Boyd, the Court attempted to clarify what constitutes a "bor-
der."'49 In another case, the Court stated that border searches are reason-
able simply because they take place at the border.5 0 In fact, faced with a
challenge to the seizure of pornographic films imported into the United
States for personal use, the Court went so far as to say that Congress has
plenary powers in the area of restrictions on imports.5 1
47. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The Almeida
Court held that a search of a defendant's car by a roving patrol on a California
highway which, at its closest point lies 20 miles from the Mexican border, would
not fall under the border search exception. Id. at 273.
48. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); United States v. Thirty-
Seven Photographs, 413 U.S. 206 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super
8 MM Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 266.
49. See Almeida, 413 U.S. at 272 (permitting searches at border and its func-
tional equivalent).
50. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616.
51. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. at 125. Congress' plenary power derives from
Article I, Section 8, clause 5, giving Congress broad, comprehensive power to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations. Id. The specific issue the Court addressed
involved the constitutionality of a federal statute prohibiting the importation of
obscene material, which the importer used solely for private, personal use and
possession. Id. The statute at issue read, in pertinent part:
All persons are prohibited from importing into the United States
from any foreign country... any obscene book, pamphlet, paper, writing,
advertisement, circular, print, picture, drawing, or other representation,
figure, or image on or of paper or other material, or any cast, instrument,
or other article which is obscene or immoral . . . . No such articles
whether imported separately or contained in packages with other goods
entitled to entry, shall be admitted to entry, and all such articles and,
unless it appears to the satisfaction of the appropriate customs officer
that the obscene or other prohibited articles contained in the package
were inclosed therein without the knowledge or consent of the importer,
owner, agent, or consignee, the entire contents of the package in which
such articles are contained, shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture ....
Provided further, that the Secretary of the Treasury may, in his discre-
tion, admit the so-called classics or books of recognized and established
literary or scientific merit, but may, in his discretion, admit such classics
or books only when imported for noncommercial purposes.
19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1913). The Court stated that "(ilmport restrictions and
searches of persons or packages at the national border rest on different considera-
tions and different rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations." 12 200-
Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. at 125. In noting Congress' plenary power in this area, the Court
stated that Congress needs such power to prevent smuggling and prohibited arti-
cles from entry. Id. at 125-26; see also Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325 (1915) (re-
marking on need for congressional authority); Brolan v. United States, 236 U.S.
216 (1915) (noting Congress' plenary power); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470,
492 (1904) (citing Congress' need for such power).
[Vol. 40: p. 835
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In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,52 the Supreme Court redefined
"border" for purposes of the border search exception, extending it be-
yond the actual border of the United States to a "functional equivalent of
the border."5 3 The Almeida Court interpreted the search of an individual
stopped by a roving Border Patrol on a California highway, twenty-five air
miles north of the Mexican border. 54 The Court held that a routine bor-
der search may occur at the border's "functional equivalent. '5 5 The facts
in Almeida did not, in the Court's opinion, meet the "functional
equivalent" test.56 Therefore, the border search exception did not ap-
ply.5 7 Some commentators viewed this "functional equivalent" test as con-
stricting the border search exception, which was moving towards an
"elastic border" in some circuit court decisions. 58 The Almeida Court also
52. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
53. Id. at 272-73.
54. Id. at 267-68. The Border Patrol, without a warrant or probable cause,
stopped the petitioner and thoroughly searched his car on State Highway 78 in
California. Id. Indeed, the Court noted that the Border Patrol did not even have
the "reasonable suspicion" required by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Id. at 268.
The only possible justification the government had for the search entailed
"§ 287(a) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a)(3) (1952), which simply provides for warrantless searches of
automobiles and other conveyances 'within a reasonable distance from any exter-
nal boundary of the United States' . . . ." Id.
55. Id. at 272-73.
56. Id.; see also Paul S. Rosenzweig, Functional Equivalents of the Border, Sover-
eignty, and the Fourth Amendment, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1119 (1985) (noting that
Supreme Court "has never defined a functional border equivalent or set forth the
scope of searches it would permit at such a location"). While not defining a pre-
cise test, the Almeida Court made reference to "a point marking the confluence of
two or more roads that extend from the border." Almeida, 413 U.S. at 273. The
Court also noted that "a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City"
would constitute a "functional equivalent." Id.
57. Almeida, 413 U.S. at 273.
58. Waples, supra note 14, at 56-58. Waples notes that once a traveller passes
a port of entry and enters the country, full Fourth Amendment protections apply.
Id. Courts have wrestled with both law and logic to determine when a traveller
reaches this point. Id. at 56. Early on, courts treated the border as an actual "bar-
rier" and as soon as an individual passed it, they entered the country. Id. at 56-57.
The courts ultimately rejected this rationale as unworkable for customs purposes
and replaced it with the concept of the "elastic border." Id. at 57. The "elastic
border" treated the border as an area rather than a line. Id. Therefore, the "elas-
tic border" represents a dynamic concept that changes with the particular facts of
each case. Id.
The Fifth Circuit extended the concept of the border search exception. As
one commentator notes:
Functional equivalency was determined by applying a three part test fo-
cusing on the ratio between international and domestic traffic passing
through the checkpoint, the permanence of the checkpoint, and the ef-
fect of the checkpoint on international traffic. The test was weighted in
favor of functional equivalency by defining "international traffic" as in-
cluding vehicles that had never crossed the border but originated in the
"immediate border area."
1995]
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held that this case did not involve a "routine" search and, therefore, re-
quired either probable cause or consent.5 9
Six years later, in United States v. Ramsey,60 the Court reinforced the
"border search exception."6 ' In Ramsey, the Court extended the border
search exception to first-class mail entering the United States. 62 Defend-
ants operated a heroin-by-mail enterprise, which consisted of mailing her-
oin from Bangkok, Thailand, to various locations in the United States.65
At New York's Kennedy Airport, deemed a "border" for search purposes, a
customs inspector identified eight suspicious, bulky envelopes in the
mail. 64 Upon inspection, he found that the envelopes contained her-
oin. 65 The Ramsey Court noted that postal regulations, alone, authorized
the search. 6 6 Therefore, the only remaining question involved the consti-
tutionality of the search. 67
Based on Boyd, decided nearly a century earlier, the Ramsey Court
held that border searches "are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that
they occur at the border."68 The Court did note, in deference to the Car-
roll decision, the qualitative differences between searches within the coun-
try, which require probable cause, and those which occur at the borders of
the country.69 The Court also reasoned that, because a port of entry does
JA. Canales & Nancy M. Simonson, Criminal Law and Procedure, 20 TEX. TECH. L.
REv. 381, 384 (1987-88) (footnotes omitted). The Fifth Circuit, in United States v.
Jackson, 825 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988),
following Almeida, overruled prior checkpoint cases and restricted patrol agents'
authority to search. Id. at 862-65.
59. Almeida, 413 U.S. at 274-75 ("[T]hose lawfully within the country, entitled
to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or
search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable
cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise.").
60. 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
61. Id. at 616. The Court cited the rationale of the Boyd Court in making this
statement. Id.
62. Id. at 624-25. For a more complete discussion of the inspection of inter-
national letter mail under the border search exception, see Annotation, Customs
Inspections by Opening International Letter Mail as Within Border Search Exception to
Fourth Amendment Requirement for Search Warrant, 36 A.L.R. FED. 864 (1978).
63. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 608. The defendants ultimately distributed the heroin
in the District of Columbia. Id.
64. Id. at 609 n.2.
65. Id. at 609-10.
66. Id. at 615. The specific regulation at issue read, in pertinent part, "[a]ny
of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may... search any
trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may have a reasonable cause to
suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to law." Id. at 611 (cit-
ing 19 U.S.C. § 482). The Ramsey Court stated that this "reasonable cause to sus-
pect" standard is significantly less stringent than the probable cause requirement
imposed by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 612-13. Therefore, as long as "reason-
able cause to suspect" exists, the Fourth Amendment does not come into play. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 616.
69. Id. at 617-18 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925)).
[Vol. 40: p. 835
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not constitute a traveller's home, a diminished expectation of privacy ex-
ists for that individual. 70
The most recent Supreme Court ruling regarding the border search
appears in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez.71 Montoya dealt with the
detention of a suspected alimentary canal drug smuggler who was de-
tained for over sixteen hours as customs inspectors waited for her to have
a bowel movement. 72 Due to the type and length of this detention, the
Court classified the search as not "routine" and, therefore, applied the
Fourth Amendment balancing test of weighing individual privacy against
the governmental interest. 73  However, because the majority opinion
found that the facts supported at least a reasonable suspicion, the Court
upheld this search. 74 The Court did, however, discuss the border search
exception. 75
Stating that searches occurring at the border rest on different consid-
erations and rules of constitutional law than domestic regulations, the
Montoya Court declared that "the Fourth Amendment's balance of reason-
ableness is qualitatively different at the international border than in the
interior."76 The Court also reinforced the notion that routine border
70. Id. at 618 (citing United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363
(1971)). The Court upheld the search and concluded that including letters within
the border search exception does not extend the exception. Id. at 619. As a result,
the Court eliminated the requirement of probable cause because the search oc-
curred at the border. Id. at 619-20.
71. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
72. Id. at 532-36. Customs officials detained Rosa Elvira Mcntoya de Her-
nandez upon her arrival at Los Angeles International Airport from Bogota, Colum-
bia. Id. at 533-34. After some brief questioning, the customs agents classified Ms.
Hernandez as an alimentary canal smugglei or "balloon swallower." Id. at 534. A
female inspector then performed a pat-down and strip search, during which she
noticed Ms. Hernandez's very firm abdomen. Id. Inspectors kept Ms. Hernandez
under surveillance for over 16 hours, until a court-ordered rectal examination veri-
fied the presence of balloons. Id. at 535-36. In all, Ms. Hernandez passed 88 bal-
loons filled with a total of 528 grams of 80% pure cocaine. Id. This passing led to
her arrest. Id.
The Court has noted a great increase in this method of smuggling. Id. at 538.
"This desperate practice appears to be a relatively recent addition to the smug-
glers' repertoire of deceptive practices, and it also appears to be exceedingly diffi-
cult to detect." Id. at 538-39. The Court cited 18 cases in 1983 and 1984, alone,
dealing with such practices. Id. at 539 n.2.
73. Id. at 537; see also Nancy L. Dzwonczyk, Criminal Procedure-Application of
the "Border Search" Exception to Exiting Individuals-United States v. Ezeiruaku, 65
TEMP. L. REv. 309, 313 (1992) (noting that because Court did not classify search as
"routine," Court balanced intrusion of search on individual's privacy as compared
to governmental interest in regulating what enters country).
74. Montoya, 473 U.S. at 542.
75. Id. at 537-41.
76. Id. at 537-38. The Court stated that "[r]outine searches of the persons
and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion,
probable cause, or warrant, and first-class mail may be opened without a warrant
on less than probable cause." Id. at 538 (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606 (1977)).
1995]
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searches, including the opening of first-class mail, need not meet any re-
quirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause or warrant. 77 The
Court also affirmed cases holding that government agents may board
boats on inland waters, with ready access to the sea, without any suspi-
cion. 78 In justifying these exceptions, the Court stated that the permissi-
bility of the search must "be judged by 'balancing its intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legiti-
mate governmental interests.' ,,79
Applying this test to the border search, where lower expectations of
privacy and stronger governmental interests exist, courts will always find
routine border searches permissible.80 Citing Boyd, the Court stated that it
has long recognized Congress' power to police entrants at international
borders.8 1 Noting a longstanding concern for the protection of the inter-
national border, the Court stated that "[t]his concern is, if anything,
heightened by the veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by
the smuggling of illicit narcotics."
8 2
After the Carroll decision in 1925, the Court has repeatedly stressed
that the rationale supporting the border search exception does not extend
to searches occurring once a person has entered the United States. 83
Once in the country, the Fourth Amendment guarantees that an individ-
ual may move and travel, without limitation, while remaining free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.8 4 In this context, the reasonableness
standard that is so lax at the border is at its strongest.85 Likewise, the
individual's right of freedom from searches and seizures extends to its
77. Id.; see, e.g., Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 606 (applying border search exception to
first-class mail).
78. Montoya, 473 U.S. at 538 (citing United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462
U.S. 579, 588 (1983)). The Court also confirmed recent cases holding that agents
may stop automobile travellers at fixed checkpoints near the border, in the ab-
sence of suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562-63
(1976) (applying border search exception to automobile search undertaken based
on driver's ethnic background). The agents may even predicate these stops on
ethnicity. Id.
79. Montoya, 473 U.S. at 537 (citing Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 588; Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967)).
80. Id. at 539-40 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 591, 615 (1983) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 538 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 554, 561 (1980)
(Powell, J., concurring)). One should remember this statement, because it likely
drives much of the recent expansion of the border search exception.
83. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 (1973) (quoting Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1973); U.S. v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of
Super 8MM Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132).
84. Almeida, 413 U.S. at 273-75.
85. Montoya, 473 U.S. at 541 (emphasizing that because search occurred at
border, less expectation of privacy existed).
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highest point.8 6 However, after evaluating the expansion of the border
search among both the circuit courts and, to a lesser extent, the Supreme
Court, this proposition seems unclear.
III. EVALUATING THE CIRCUITS
A. Other Circuits and the Border Search Exception
This Casebrief focuses on the border search exception in the Third
Circuit.8 7 A review of the other Circuit Courts of Appeals uncovered an
expanding border search. 88 This expansion must include a heightened
scrutiny of the expansion and its application. 89 The importance of this
scrutiny heightens when judging enforcement measures, because human
nature dictates that any exception will ultimately reach, and possibly ex-
ceed, its limits. 90
The border search, as originally contemplated by the Boyd court,
slowly expanded in the circuit courts through the development of the
"elastic border."91 Then, in Almeida, the Supreme Court redefined the
scope of the exception and attempted to limit its application by introduc-
ing the "functional equivalent" of the border.92
86. Carroll 267 U.S. at 154.
87. The Supreme Court decisions discussed above have settled the parame-
ters of the border search exception. Due to the Third Circuit's reliance upon the
other circuits and the Supreme Court for guidance regarding application of the
border search exception, however, the Casebrief quickly reviews these decisions.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1296 (4th Cir. 1995) (joining
Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals in ap-
plying border search exception to outgoing travellers).
89. See Ittig, supra note 14 at 330-35 (noting societal standards change over
time with respect to privacy and dignity of individuals).
90. See Yale, supra note 1, at 750-52 (noting that exception which removes
"the probable cause and warrant requirement makes the judicial task of guarding
against excesses carried out by law enforcement officials far more difficult"). Com-
mentators have argued that when courts remove the requirement of advance judi-
cial approval, they ignore the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 751.
Indeed, Justice Jackson cautioned that "[w]e must remember that the extent of
any privilege of search and seizure without warrant which we sustain, the officers
interpret and apply themselves and will push to the limit." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
91. Sims, supra note 13, at 1647; see, e.g.; United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d
214, 217 (5th Cir. 1973) (developing elastic border); United States v. Glaziou, 402
F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1968) (same), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969); Marsh v.
United States, 344 F.2d 317, 324 (5th Cir. 1965) (same).
92. United States v.Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 854-55 (5th Cir. 1987). The Jackson
court noted, however, that the Almeida Court only gave two examples of a "func-
tional equivalent" and did not define the term. Id. "The circuit courts, however,
have examined in some detail the notion of functionally equivalent borders." Id.
For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's use of the term, see Jackson, 825 F.2d at 855-
60. For a more complete discussion of the decision in Almeida and its effect on the
"elastic border" concept, see supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
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A second trend among the circuit courts involves expanding the ex-
ception to outgoing searches. 93 Until twenty years ago, most courts recog-
nized a substantial difference between incoming and outgoing searches by
requiring probable cause before a warrantless outgoing search occurred.9 4
More recently, however, courts have discounted this difference and re-
quire no probable cause for outgoing searches. 95 While the Supreme
Court has not directly ruled on this issue, lower courts have primarily re-
lied upon dicta in two Supreme Court decisions tojustify this expansion. 96
The Ninth Circuit represents the first court to expressly expand the
border search exception to outgoing travellers.9 7 The court reviewed
Supreme Court decisions in this area and, while noting that it may extend
present law, held that similarity of purpose, rationale and effect in outgo-
ing and incoming searches support the application of the border search
exception to outgoing travellers. 98 Although the Supreme Court has
never directly confronted the issue, on at least two occasions it has im-
pliedly addressed the extension of the exception to outgoing travellers. 99
93. United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1991).
94. Yale, supra note 1, at 734; see, e.g., Samora v. United States, 406 F.2d 1095,
1098 (5th Cir. 1969) (recognizing differences between incoming and outgoing
searches); United States v. Marti, 321 F. Supp. 59, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (same).
95. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 141. This trend started with a Ninth Circuit deci-
sion in 1976. United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 917 (1978); see also United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1980)
(justifying border search exception's applicability to outgoing searches), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981). The Stanley court held that the border search excep-
tion warranted extension to outgoing searches based on several similarities
between incoming and outgoing searches. Stanley, 545 F.2d at 667. These similari-
ties include: (1) the government interest in protecting its citizens from drug smug-
gling; (2) the likelihood of smuggling attempts at the border; (3) the difficulty in
detecting drug smuggling; (4) an individual receives notice of potential searches
when crossing the border; and (5) the inspectors search the individual only be-
cause he represents a member of a morally neutral class (international traveller).
Id. Conceding that this "may be an extension of present law," the Stanley court
justified its holding on the "similarity of purpose, rationale and effect between
[incoming and outgoing searches]." Id.
96. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 140 (citing California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416
U.S. 21 (1974);Julian v. United States, 463 U.S. 1308 (1983)).
97. Stanley, 545 F.2d at 661.
98. Id. at 667.
99. Julian, 463 U.S. at 1310 (stating that outgoing border search requires
neither probable cause nor warrant (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,
616-19 (1977)); California Bankers Ass'n, 416 U.S. at 63 (noting in dicta that "those
entering and leaving the country may be examined as to their belongings and
effects, all without violating the Fourth Amendment").
The recent Fourth Circuit decision of United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290
(4th Cir. 1995) contains a good discussion of the limited Supreme Court treatment
of the border search exception in outgoing search cases. The majority opinion,
which upheld the border search exception as applied to outgoing searches, stated:
[A] lthough the Supreme Court has not yet ruled directly on the question
of whether the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies to persons leaving the country, a chambers opinion and other dicta
suggest that it does. SeeJulian v. United States, 463 U.S. 1308, 103 S. Ct.
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Circuit court decisions since Stanley have relied upon these two Supreme
Court decisions in holding the border search exception applicable to out-
going searches. 100 Presently, virtually every Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sion on this issue applies the border search exception to searches of
outgoing as well as incoming travellers.'0 1
Likewise, circuit courts define the "functional equivalent" broadly and
rarely base a decision on a finding that the search did not occur at a bor-
der or its "functional equivalent."10 2 Often, the courts responsible for
3522, 77 L. Ed.2d 1290 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983) (applying bor-
der search exception articulated in Ransey to a person and his effects as
he attempted to depart the country on a flight destined for Peru); Cali-
fornia Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 63, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1518, 39 L.
Ed. 2d 812 (1974) (dicta) (suggesting that those "entering and leaving
the country may be examined as to their belongings and effects, all with-
out violating the Fourth Amendment").
Oriakhi, 57 F.3d at 1296, n.4.
In a dissenting opinion, however, Judge Phillips argued that in the context of
outgoing searches, courts should employ the normal balancing test. Id. at 1300
(Phillips, J., dissenting). This test entails a comparison of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate gov-
ernmental purposes. Id. at 1301 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Phillips argues that the
Supreme Court has simply not ruled, directly or indirectly, on the issue of the
applicability of the border search exception to outgoing searches. Id. at 1303
(Phillips, J., dissenting). Additionally, circuit courts should not look to these cases
for guidance. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
100. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 141 (relying upon California Bankers Ass'n and Ju-
lian to extend border search exception); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830,
834 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that California Bankers Ass'n decision removed any
doubt about applying border search exception to outgoing travellers).
101. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d at 1296; Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 140; United States v. Ber-
isha, 925 F.2d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 68
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043 (1988); United States v. Hernandez-
Salazar, 813 F.2d 1126, 1138 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d
831, 839 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 896 (1983); see also Kyriazis & Caldwell,
supra note 19, at 636 n.56 (noting that circuit courts often seem hesitant to per-
form their own analysis and instead refer to other circuit court decisions that char-
acterize outbound searches as routine). But see United States v. Des Jardins, 747
F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1984) (refusing to apply border search exception to outgo-
ing travellers), vacated in part, 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985).
Some commentators have attacked the border search exception as applied to
outgoing travellers.
Although widely applied, the reverse border search exception has been
severely criticized. Yet, despite the differences between the two excep-
tions, the standard of proof required under the reverse border search
exception parallels the standard used in traditional border searches.
Therefore, since a routine border search does not require a quantum of
proof, the border search and reverse border search exception would per-
mit a customs service agent to conduct, at will, a routine search of any
departing passenger.
Ambramovsky, supra note 15, at 486-87 (footnotes omitted).
102. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 606 (holding that New York's Kennedy Airport
constitutes functional equivalent of border); Almeida Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266 (1973) (noting that St. Louis airport might constitute functional
equivalent if flight originated in Mexico City); Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 136 (holding
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these expansions offer little new analysis, but simply refer to the historical
argument advanced by Boyd and the other Supreme Court cases dealing
with traditional border search analysis.' 0 3
In conclusion, many of these cases deal with the Mexican-American
border, where an epidemic of both drug smuggling and illegal alien smug-
gling exists. 104 At least one commentator notes that the vast majority of
border search cases occur in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which include
those states bordering Mexico, particularly California and Texas.' 05 Be-
cause the smuggling of illegal aliens across the international border in the
Third Circuit does not appear problematic, this smuggling concern may
not apply to the Third Circuit.
Finally, the recent expansion of the border search exception among
the circuits has other non-judicial motivations. Courts find express con-
gressional authority in federal statutes that authorize expanding the bor-
der search exception to officials attempting to detect currency
smuggling. 10 6 The federal currency reporting statute, for example, gives
customs officers authority to conduct border searches in order to control
the flow of unreported currency through the borders of the United
States.' 0 7 One justification for this statute involves the relationship be-
tween imported drugs, general drug trafficking and smuggling of associ-
ated currency out of the United States.' 0 8 Against this backdrop,
considering the Supreme Court cases discussed earlier, the brief summary
of the other circuits' treatment of the border search exception and the
concept that not all "borders" -pose the same threats and concerns, this
Casebrief now examines the Third Circuit's treatment of the border
search exception.
Philadelphia International Airport represents functional equivalent of interna-
tional border).
103. Yale, supra note 1, at 737-39. The only question left for the court involves
determining whether the search is "routine."
104. Patrick McDonnell, Judge Rejects Drug Searches at Checkpoints; Civil Rights:
Federal Government's Bid To Allow Stops Without Probable Cause Is Called Unconstitu-
tional, LA. TIMES, May 26, 1990, at 1. McDonnell notes that federal prosecutors
submitted statistics demonstrating that the volume of drug trafficking across the
2,000 mile long U.S.-Mexico border has soared. Id. Border seizures of cocaine
increased from fewer than 60 kilograms in 1982 to almost 12,000 kilograms in
1989, while seizures of marijuana increased from approximately 27,000 kilograms
to almost 200,000 kilograms in the same period. Id.
105. Waples, supra note 14 at 55 n.10. The author notes that other courts
look to Fifth and Ninth Circuits for guidance on the border search issue because of
frequency of cases they receive from smuggling across Mexican-American border.
Id.
106. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b) (1988). For the text of this statute, see supra note
40.
107. 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b).
108. United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136, 136 (3d Cir. 1991).
[Vol. 40: p. 835
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.B. The Border Search Exception In the Third Circuit
The Third Circuit, like the other Circuit Courts of Appeals, has ex-
panded the parameters of the border search exception. 10 9 Indeed, Third
Circuit culture regarding the border search exception has favored a broad
application for over twenty years. 1' ° For example, the Third Circuit
quickly joined other courts in applying the exception to mail and pack-
ages. 11 ' Likewise, the Third Circuit rapidly embraced the "elastic border"
concept by extending the exception in the early 1970s. 112 In 1984, the
Third Circuit dispelled any doubt surrounding its future position. 13
109. United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116, 116 (3d. Cir. 1994); Ezeiruaku, 936
F.2d at 136.
110. See United States v. Diaz, 503 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1974). The Diaz court,
dealing with a strip-search occurring at the border, stated:
[i]nstead of the usual requirement of probable cause to believe that an
individual possesses contraband or that he has committed a crime de-
manded by the Fourth Amendment, a customs officer need only have a
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity .... A customs officer has the
unique power to stop a person at an international entry point to conduct
a "border search" without having a search warrant and even having prob-
able cause to believe the person has committed a crime.... Recognition
of this diminished constitutional standard is reflected in 19 U.S.C. § 482,
specifically authorizing customs officers to stop and search vehicles or
persons in or on which they suspect there is merchandise illegally
brought into the United States. It does not, of course, exempt border
searches from the constitutional test of reasonableness.
Id. (citing United States v. Beck, 483 F.2d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 1973)); see also United
States v. Nelson, 593 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that Mount Pocono Airport
in Pennsylvania represents "functional equivalent" of border when flight
originated abroad).
111. United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1018, 1065 (1985). The Glasser court held that customs officers have the au-
thority to open and search packages mailed to the country at their port of entry,
even without articulating a "reasonable cause to suspect." Id. at 1200.
112. Beck, 483 F.2d at 203. The Beck court stated that a desire to stop illegal
smuggling supported its rationale. Id. at 207. "The magnitude of the smuggling
and theft problems on our extensive international borders and numerous interna-
tional airports and seaports had led to the formulation of special, pragmatic stan-
dards for judging the legality of stops and searches in or around such border areas
or international port facilities." Id. In evaluating the extent of the exception, the
court noted "[p]ractical considerations dictate a certain amount of elasticity in
describing the area within which the border search standard is constitutionally ap-
propriate." Id. After noting the necessity of a case-by-case determination, the
court stated that the border "has been expanded to 'a reasonably extended geo-
graphic area in the immediate vicinity of any entry point.'" Id. at 207-08 (citing
United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1968)).
113. Glasser hinted at the court's future direction when it stated that "[i]t can-
not be questioned that Congress has plenary power to police the borders of the
United States." Glasser, 750 F.2d at 1201 (citing United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of
Super 8MM Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126 (1973); Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325, 329
(1915); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492 (1904)); see also Beck, 483 F.2d at
202 (stating that "[oin a constitutional level, then, it is beyond question that
agents of the federal government may, without cause, search persons and packages
entering the country without violating the rights guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment").
1995]
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Since then, the Third Circuit has not limited the expansion of the border
search exception in any significant manner. 114 Additionally, the most re-
cent Third Circuit statements on the border search exception reflect little
desire to restrict the exception. 115
In 1991, the Third Circuit addressed the question of whether the bor-
der search exception applied to outgoing travelers in United States v.
Ezeiruaku.116 In Ezeiruaku, customs officials at Philadelphia International
Airport conducted an operation designed to detect the smuggling of cur-
rency out of the United States.' 17 During the operation, officials targeted
Mr. Ezeiruaku because he fit a possible smuggler's profile. 118 Inspectors
searched Mr. Ezeiruaku's checked luggage, without his knowledge. 119
The search uncovered various shipping documents and $265,000 in
114. See, e.g., United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding
Pittsburgh International Airport represents "functional equivalent" of border and
reinforcing validity of border searches without warrant or probable cause as long
as government shows relevant individual or item searched crossed border).
In fact, at least one commentator urges that any retreat by the courts in the
area of the border search exception would place the burden on Congress to
amend the Constitution to expressly authorize the exception. Barnett, supra note
33, at 48.
The writer cannot stress too vigorously the importance of the issues
raised so blithely, without reason or authority by those individuals who
attack the rights of the Government at its border.
Should these attacks prevail it would require amendment (modifica-
tion) of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution to recognize expressly
the border search power of the Bureau of Customs implicitly recognized
therein since 1789 to cure the immediate and catastrophic injury that
would result from such an interpretation of the governing statutes and
regulations.
Id. (emphasis added).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1994); United States
v. Ezeiraku, 936 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1991).
116. 936 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1991). For a detailed discussion of the Ezeiruaku
decision and its potential ramifications, see Dwonczyk, supra note 72 and Susan L.
Wallace, Comment, Constitutional Law-Border Searches-Applying Fourth Amendment
Border Search Exception to Outgoing Searches, United States v. Ezeiruaku, 16 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L.J. 228 (1992).
117. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 137.
118. Id. at 137-38. Specifically, customs agents noted that Mr. Ezeiruaku
dressed in expensive clothing, checked two large, overweight suitcases, paid for the
overweight charges in cash, travelled with a woman who appeared nervous and
spoke with a Nigerian accent. Id. At least one of the inspectors knew that certain
Nigerians were at risk for smuggling money and merchandise out of the country
without paying duty. Id. at 138. Both of these items require an export license. Id.
119. Id.
[Vol. 40: p. 835
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cash.1 20 The federal currency reporting statute, 12 1 which controls the
flow of currency out of the country, authorized this search.1 2 2 The Gov-
ernment argued that the statute represents a codification of the border
search exception and, therefore, specifically applied to outgoing
searches. 123
The Third Circuit held that, because the search of Mr. Ezeiruaku's
luggage constituted a "routine" search and occurred at the "functional
equivalent" of the border, it represented a reasonable and valid search.
124
The court, relying in large part on prior decisions of the Fifth and Elev-
enth Circuits, held that the same justifications for the search of incoming
travellers applied to outgoing travellers.' 2 5 In reaching this decision, the
court 'join[ed] the Second, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals in concluding that the traditional rationale for the border search
exception applies as well in the outgoing border search context."
126
More recently, in United States v. Hyde,127 the Third Circuit reversed a
ruling of the District Court of the Virgin Islands regarding the border
120. Id. The reason for searching Mr. Ezeiruaku's bags included his destina-
tion, his cash payment for the overnight pass, his female companion's nervous
appearance, his unusual interest in the customs area and the prior experience of
the customs officials in these types of searches. Id. A later search of Mr. Ezeiruaku
and his carry-on luggage uncovered more documents indicating shipments to Ni-
geria and $2,000 in cash. Id. This cash, however, did not exceed the $10,000 re-
porting limit. Id.
121. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316-17 (1988). Section 5316 deals with reports on the ex-
portation and importation of monetary instruments. Id. The relevant portion of
the statute requires the traveller to file a report if that person knowingly transports
more than $10,000 either into or out of the United States. 31 U.S.C.
§ 5316(a) (1) (A)-(a) (1) (B).
122. 31 U.S.C. § 5316. The authority for the search arose from a 1986 amend-
ment to 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b), which reads:
[f]or purposes of ensuring compliance with the requirements of section
5316 [the currency reporting statute], a customs officer may stop and
search, at the border and without a search warrant, any vehicle, vessel,
aircraft, or other conveyance, any envelope or other container, and any
person entering or departing from the United States.
31 U.S.C. § 5317(b). Prior to the 1986 amendment, section 5317 required a war-
rant before conducting the search. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 139.
123. Id. at 140.
124. Id. at 143.
125. Id. at 142-43 (citing United States v. Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d 1126,
1138 (1lth Cir. 1987); United States v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1991)).
126. Id. at 143. The cases referred to by the Third Circuit include: Berisha,
925 F.2d at 795; Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d at 1126; United States v. Udofot, 711
F.2d 831 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 896 (1983); United States v. Ajlouny, 629
F.2d 830, 834 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981); United States v.
Swarovski, 592 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978). Ezeiruaku demonstrated the Third
Circuit's tendency to join in the expansion of the border search exception beyond
its original scope.
127. 37 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1994).
1995]
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search exception.1 28 In Hyde, three defendants prepared to board a plane
from St. Thomas to Miami, Florida.12 9 Subsequently, customs inspectors
asked them some routine questions.130 The customs inspectors became
suspicious when the defendants appeared nervous while answering the
questions.13 1 Consequently, the inspectors conducted a routine pat-down
search.13 2 As a result of these searches, the inspectors discovered a pack-
age of cocaine taped to each defendant's body.1 3 3
The district court held that the border search doctrine did not apply
because the defendants' travel from St. Thomas to Florida did not involve
crossing an international border.1 3 4 On the other hand, the Court of Ap-
128. Id. at 117.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 117-18.
131. Id.
132. Id. As previously noted, the defense did not argue that the search consti-
tuted anything other than a "routine" search. Id. at 118 n.1. For a more complete
discussion of what constitutes a "routine" search, see supra notes 59, 72-80, 124-33
and infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
133. Id. at 118.
134. United States v. Hyde, No. 93-65, 1993 WL 733094 (D.V.I. Oct. 21,
1993), rev'd, 37 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1994). The district court noted that United
States v. Chabot, 531 F. Supp. 1063 (D.V.I. 1982), represents the only case dealing
with this issue. Hyde, 1993 WL 733094, at *4. This case concerned the search of a
small plane flying from Puerto Rico to the Virgin Islands. Id. at *4-5. The court,
however, stated that because the Chabot court found no reasonable suspicion for
that search, its statement upholding the validity of the search constituted mere
dicta. Id. at *5.
The district court stated that because the Virgin Islands do not border the
United States mainland, it does not necessarily create a "customs zone" between
the two areas. Id. at *4. "[T]he existence of a border hinges on notions of sover-
eignty and not upon traditional concepts of geography." Id. (footnote omitted)
(citing Torres v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979)). The court
also stated that inspectors cannot dispense with the protections of the Fourth
Amendment because of the urgent law enforcement needs in preventing smug-
gling. Id. The court further evaluated the relationship between the United States
and the Virgin Islands in stating:
There is no quarrel with Chabot's observation that the unique customs
position of the Virgin Islands is largely due to the historical fact that,
when the Virgin Islands were purchased by the United States, Danish law
"was already in place which provided for Customs duties to be levied
upon the goods coming into the Virgin Islands, with the revenue going to
the colonial treasury."
Id. at *5 (quoting Chabot, 531 F. Supp. at 1069 (citing Danish Colonial Law of Apr.
6, 1906, § 56, reprinted in V.I. CODE ANN., tit. 1 (1967))). The United States govern-
ment continued these laws. Id. Nonetheless, the Hyde court could not find any
case law or legislative history demonstrating that by continuing them, the govern-
ment intended to remove the protections of the Fourth Amendment from people
in the Virgin Islands. Id.
This court has not found any case law to support the legal concept of a
border, intermediate or otherwise, between the Virgin Islands and the
continental United States merely because of the Islands' political status as
a territory of the United States. To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit has
suggested that there is no such border for United States territories.
Id. at *4, n.10 (citing Barsuch v. Calvo, 685 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1982)).
[Vol. 40: p. 835
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peals concluded that the United States/Virgin Islands border (US/VI bor-
der) constituted the "functional equivalent" of an international border.' 35
Applying the border search exception, the Third Circuit held "that rou-
tine customs searches of persons and their belongings without probable
cause as they leave the Virgin Islands for the continental United States are
not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."' 36
Noting that previous Supreme Court decisions do not directly support
the application of the border search exception to this search, the Third
Circuit relied upon the rationale employed by those cases in upholding
the reasonableness of these searches. 137 In finding that the US/VI border
constitutes the "functional equivalent" of an international border, the
Hyde court relied in part upon a prior Third Circuit case which held that
the Virgin Islands represent an unincorporated territory of the United
States.1 38 The court in Hyde also cited two early Supreme Court cases con-
cerning Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal. 39 Finally, the court over-
ruled two recent decisions of the District Court of the Virgin Islands that
did not classify the US/VI border as a "customs zone."' 40 Thus, the Hyde
decision continued the expansion of the border search exception under
Third Circuit jurisprudence.
Generally, the trend in the Third Circuit, as well as in most other
circuit courts, involves expanding the border search exception. 4 1 In par-
ticular, the Third Circuit's recent treatment of the border search excep-
tion evidences this trend. 142 In order to gauge when the Third Circuit will
stop this expansion, one needs to review thoroughly the rationale of the
Third Circuit decisions expanding the exception.
135. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 117.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 122 (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); Carrol v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Kaufman & Sons, Co. v. Smith, 216 U.S. 610
(1910); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)).
138. Smith v. Government of Virgin Islands, 375 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1967).
139. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 121 (citing Smith, 375 F.2d at 714; Kaufman & Sons, Co.,
216 U.S. at 611; Downes, 182 U.S. at 244.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Douglas, 854 F. Supp. 383 (D.V.I. 1994) (hold-
ing that Virgin Islands do not constitute border for purposes of border search
exception); United States v. Hyde, No. 93-65, 1993 WL 733094 (D.V.I. Oct. 21,
1993) ("Since the United States is sovereign over the United States Virgin Islands,
it would seem obvious that there is no basis for a border search of individuals
travelling directly to the mainland from the territory."), revd, 37 F.3d 116 (3d Cir.
1994); cf. United States v. Reyes, No. 92-337, 1993 WL 151880, at *4-5 (D.P.R. Apr.
23, 1993) (holding that Virgin Islands represents separate and distinct "customs
zone" and therefore, border search exception applied to boat travelling from Vir-
gin Islands to Puerto Rico because agents could reasonably assume boat crossed
customs border).
141. For a discussion of this trend, see supra notes 87-108 and accompanying
text.
142. See Hyde, 37 F.3d at 116 (expanding concept of border to include border
between United States and Virgin Islands); United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d
136, 136 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying border search exception to outgoing travellers).
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IV. How FAR WILL THE THIRD CIRCUIT EXTEND THE BORDER SEARCH
EXCEPTION?
In both Hyde and Ezeiruaku, the Third Circuit reinforced the border
search exception. 143 In each case, the Third Circuit cited Boyd and its
progeny to justify the searches in question. 14 Although virtually unques-
tioned by courts for over 100 years, certain commentators have challenged
this justification. 145 The real question facing the court involves whether
the particular facts of each case constitute a routine search and, therefore,
fit within the clear parameters of the exception. 146 The manner in which
the Third Circuit evaluated the facts and circumstances in each case re-
flects its commitment to expanding the exception's reach.
14 7
A. The Expansion to Outgoing Travellers
The major issue that the Ezeiruaku court settled involved applying the
exception equally both to the search of persons entering and persons exit-
ing the United States. 148 The Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
had not ruled directly on the issue and, therefore, turned to other Circuit
Courts of Appeals. 149 The Third Circuit also relied on dicta from two
Supreme Court decisions, cited by the other Circuit Courts of Appeals, to
justify its decision. 150 Congress also enacted a statute that authorized war-
rantless searches for discovering smuggled currency.151 Additionally, the
rationale underlying this decision evidenced the Third Circuit's fear of
drug smuggling and its attempts to curtail this activity.
152
143. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 118 (noting that border searches constitute exception to
Fourth Amendment requirements); Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 140 ("[W]e have stated
that 'it is well established that searches of persons or property at the border are
considered reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment simply by
virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.' " (quoting United States v. Glasser,
750 F.2d 1197, 1201 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1018, 1068 (1985)).
144. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 118-19; Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 140.
145. Wallace, supra note 115, at 243. Wallace argues that the traditional justi-
fication of a border search's reasonableness, because it occurs at the border, repre-
sents a circular argument which sidesteps the traditional constitutional balancing
test. Id.; Yale, supra note 1, at 745-52.
146. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 116; Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 136.
147. For a detailed review of these decisions, see supra notes 116-40 and infra
notes 148-79 and accompanying text.
148. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 137.
149. Id. at 141.
150. Id. ("[Tihose entering and leaving the country may be examined as to
their belongings and effects, all without violating the Fourth Amendment.") (cit-
ing California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 63 (1974); Julian v. United
States, 463 U.S. 1308 (1983)).
151. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316-5317 (1988).
152. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 143. The court explained that:
This, too, must be said. Although there is not the slightest suggestion
that [Mr. Ezeiruaku] was implicated in drug trafficking, in an environ-
ment that sees a massive importation of drugs across our borders, we are
cognizant that there must be a concomitant outflow of cash to pay for this
[Vol. 40: p. 835860
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Congressional authority for the legal search for currency, coupled
with the assumption that smuggled currency relates to drug trade, pro-
vided the Third Circuit with the support necessary to extend the border
search exception to outgoing travellers. 153 The Third Circuit based its
decision upon prior rulings from the other circuit courts evidencing an
intent to apply the border search exception to outgoing travellers, con-
gressional authority and the Third Circuit's general attitude toward the
border search exception. 15 4 Thus, the Third Circuit's extension of the
border search exception should not be surprising.
As a result, the key issue facing the Ezeiruaku court concerned classify-
ing the search as routine.1 5 5 The court quickly resolved this issue by not-
ing that the search only involved the inspection of Mr. Ezeiruaku's
luggage. 156 Affording customs officials wide latitude, the court stated "the
border search of luggage is 'routine' and requires no degree of suspi-
cion."'15 7 The Third Circuit criticized the district court's characterization
of this search as "non-routine. 15 8 The Court of Appeals stated that the
district court's determination "flies in the face of the clear teachings of
this court as well as [authority from other jurisdictions]."15 9 Once the
court classified the search as "routine," the evidence became admissible.
Therefore, based on the Third Circuit's broad approach of applying the
border search exception, the ultimate disposition in many cases turns on
whether the court deems the search "routine" or "non-routine."
160
nefarious traffic. Strong dictates of public policy reinforce the necessity
of identifying, if not monitoring or controlling, a cash outflow from the
country as well as an influx of narcotics into the country.
Id.
153. Id. at 140.
154. Dzwonczyk, supra note 73, at 317-18.
155. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 140.
156. Id. (relying upon prior Third Circuit case of United States v. Scheer, 600
F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam), which held that border search of luggage con-
stitutes "routine" search and requires no degree of suspicion).
157. Id. at 140 (citing United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043 (1988); United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d
1341, 1345 (l1th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984); United States v. Udofot,
711 F.2d 831, 839-40 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 896 (1983); United States v.
Scheer, 600 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Swarovski, 592
F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973, 975 (2d Cir.
1978); United States v. Bareno-Burgos, 739 F. Supp. 772, 778 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)).
158. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d at 143 ("National interests in the flow of currency
justify the diminished recognition of privacy inherent in the crossing into and out
of the borders of the United States.").
159. Id. at 141. For a listing of those cases cited by the court as authority from
other jurisdictions, see supra note 157.
160. Id. at 139 (noting that district court suppressed evidence based on its
classification of search in question as "non-routine" and, therefore, in violation of
Fourth.Amendment); see also Kyriazis & Caldwekk, supra note 19, at 620 ("The one
crack in this otherwise monolithic rule has been the 'non-routine' border search
of... passengers.").
1995]
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B. The Expansion of the Term "Border"
The Hyde court found express congressional consent for its hold-
ing.16 1 Like the Ezeiruaku court, the court in Hyde began by reinforcing
prior case law upholding the border search exception. 162 The critical is-
sue facing the Hyde court involved defining the US/VI border as an "inter-
national border" or a "functional equivalent" thereof.1 63 The Hyde court
conceded that prior Supreme Court decisions, relating to the border
search exception, dealt with "international borders" and, therefore, did
not directly control this case.16 4 By holding that the border search excep-
tion applies to individuals travelling from the Virgin Islands to the United
States mainland, however, the court relied on the rationale supporting
these Supreme Court decisions. 16 5
In addition, the court focused on the historical treatment of the Vir-
gin Islands by Congress and other unincorporated territories by the
Supreme Court.16 6 Ironically, in expanding the reach of the border
search exception, Hyde cited to the Almeida decision, which arguably lim-
ited the "elastic border."' 67
After reviewing the Supreme Court decisions establishing the border
search exception, the Hyde court detailed two early Supreme Court deci-
sions dealing with customs laws governing Puerto Rico and the Panama
Canal Zone.168 These decisions defined the status of territories acquired
by the United States and Congress' authority to impose customs laws in
such territories. 169 The Hyde court concluded that because the Virgin Is-
161. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 121. The statute giving this consent provides that:
Whenever a vessel from a foreign port or place or from a port or
place in any Territory or possession of the United States arrives at a port
or place in the United States... the appropriate customs officer for such
port or place of arrival may... cause inspection, examination, and search
to be made of the persons, baggage, and merchandise discharged or un-
laden from such vessel.
Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1467). The court also noted that the inspection "conducted
in this case, at the point of departure from the Virgin Islands instead of arrival
within the United States, is authorized by 19 C.F.R. § 122.144(b)." Id. n.4.
162. Id. at 118-20 (reinforcing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990);
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S.
123 (1973); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); Harris
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
163. Id. at 120.
164. Id. at 122 (agreeing with appellants that prior Supreme Court cases such
as Boyd, Downes and Kaufman & Sons, Co. do not directly support application of
border search exception to search at issue).
165. Id. at 122-23.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 120 n.4.
168. Id. at 120-21. For a discussion of these two cases, see infra note 169 and
accompanying text.
169. Id. The first case, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), dealt with the
question of whether new territory acquired by the United States automatically be-
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lands do not "materially" differ from Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal
Zone at the time of those decisions, "it is clear that Congress has the au-
thority to create a border for customs purposes between the Virgin Islands
and the rest of the country."' 7 0 The court specifically examined Congress'
treatment of customs laws regarding the Virgin Islands to determine if
Congress created a "customs zone" between the United States and the Vir-
gin Islands. 17 1
The Hyde court viewed Congress' post-acquisition actions as intending
to create a border between the United States and the Virgin Islands for
customs purposes.' 72 After examining a series of customs laws passed by
Congress, the Hyde court noted that customs searches repeatedly occurred
at the US/VI border for over seventy-five years. 173
Next, the court addressed the similarities between Congress' broad
power to regulate commerce among the United States and its territories,
and its power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.' 7 4 Based on
these powers and the historical treatment of the US/VI border, the court
stated that the same protections which justify the use of routine warrant-
less searches at this internal customs border exist at the traditional inter-
national customs border. 75 Consequently, the court stated that "as far as
the interests of the sovereign are concerned, we perceive the interest of
came incorporated into the United States. In Downes, the plaintiff claimed a cus-
toms law, which charged a duty for merchandise shipped from Puerto Rico to the
United States, violated Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution providing "all du-
ties, imports and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Downes,
182 U.S. at 246. Although the Court did not reach a majority, five Justices agreed
that territory acquired by the United States does not become "incorporated" until
Congress specifically acts. Id. For a more complete discussion of the distinction
between "incorporated" and "unincorporated" territories, see infra note 184. A
later case, Kaufman & Sons, Co. v. Smith, 261 U.S. 610 (1910), relied upon Downes
in upholding congressional authority to adopt a statute which provided that:
all laws affecting imports of articles, goods, wares, and merchandise and
entry of persons into the United States from foreign countries shall apply
to articles, goods, wares, and merchandise and persons coming from the
Canal Zone, Isthmus of Panama, and seeking entry into any State or Ter-
ritory of the United States or the District of Columbia.
Kaufrman & Sons, Co., 261 U.S. at 611.
170. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 121.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 121.
173. Id. at 122. The court went so far as to say that Congress expressly author-
ized customs searches for travellers between the mainland and the Virgin Islands.
Id. The court cited 19 U.S.C. section 1467, which provides in part:
Whenever a vessel from a foreign port or place or from a port or place in
any Territory or possession of the United States arrives at a port or place
in the United States... the appropriate customs officer for such port or
place of arrival may... cause inspection, examination, and search to be
made of persons, baggage, and merchandise discharged or unladen from
such vessel.
19 U.S.C. § 1467 (1982).
174. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 122.
175. Id.
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the United States in warrantless searches without probable cause at this
'internal' border to be little different from its interest in such searches at
its international borders. ' 176
In examining the individual's right to privacy, the Hyde court also
analogized to traditional international travellers and stated that a dimin-
ished reasonable expectation of privacy existed at the US/VI border. 177
At least one commentator has criticized this analysis of an individual's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, arguing that "[m]erely because someone
or something is entering the country is no reason to dispense with the
safeguards ordinarily provided by the Fourth Amendment."' 78 Finally, the
court further noted that the public's knowledge of the Virgin Islands' dis-
tinctive status would alert travellers "to the possibility of border inquiries
not experienced at state lines." 179
C. Will the Border Search Exception Expand to State Borders?
Can the courts continue to expand the border search until it reaches
beyond international borders or functional equivalents thereof?. Will
courts determine that the country has not effectively eliminated the evils it
sought to prevent through border searches? Will this determination cause
the courts to expand the border search exception again? The Supreme
Court has attempted to limit the use of the border search exception, stat-
ing that different considerations apply to searches once a person enters
the country.' 80 The Third Circuit appears to agree with this approach.18 '
A careful reading of the Third Circuit's reasoning and rationale, however,
might support another expansion of the border search exception.
1. The Relationship Between the United States and the Virgin Islands, as
Interpreted by the Third Circuit
In order to properly analyze the Third Circuit's treatment of the bor-
der search exception in Hyde and address its possible future ramifications
to state borders, one must obtain at least a cursory understanding of the
relationship between the United States and the territory of the United
States Virgin Islands. 182 The United States acquired the Virgin Islands in
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Yale, supra note 1, at 751.
179. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 122.
180. United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
181. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 122. The Hyde court stressed that the United States'
strong interest in protecting its borders and the similarity of the "internal" border
at issue in the case to traditional international borders provides justification for its
holding. Id.
182. The United States Virgin Islands represents one of five island political
communities existing in the Pacific and Caribbean that constitute a part of the
United States, but have not attained statehood. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving
Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U.
HAw. L. REv. 445, 447 (1992). "The island groups that now fly the U.S. flag but are
864 [Vol. 40: p. 835
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1916 and placed it among the territories comprising the Third Circuit. 183
The Third Circuit declared the Virgin Islands an "organized" but "unin-
corporated" territory of the United States.' 84 Because the Virgin Islands
have not and may never become a state, 185 disagreement exists over its
not states are the Territory of American Samoa, the Territory of Guam, the Com-
monwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), the Commonwealth of Pu-
erto Rico and the Territory of the United States Virgin Islands." Id.
183. The Virgin Islands consist of the islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix and St.
John, which the United States purchased from Denmark in 1916 for the sum of
$25 million. Van Dyke, supra note 182, at 494-95. At that time the Naval Depart-
ment controlled the Islands. Id. at 495. The Navy planned to use the Islands as a
base of operations against German Naval activity in the Atlantic Ocean. Id. In a
series of Acts by Congress, the United States government struggled over how to
run the new islands and what type of representation they should have in the
United States government. Id. at 496-98.
In 1981, Congress finally approved a Constitution for the Virgin Islands. Id. at
498. The Virgin Islands do not, however, have autonomy from federal regulation.
Id. As the Third Circuit has consistently held, "Congress has plenary power to
legislate on matters affecting these islands." Id.
184. Smith v. Government of Virgin Islands, 375 F.2d 714, 717-18 (3d Cir.
1967); see also Van Dyke, supra note 182, at 450 (noting that Virgin Islands "are now
considered by the federal government's executive branch to be an 'unincorpo-
rated' territor[y]").
In a series of cases in 1901, the Supreme Court introduced the distinctions
between "incorporated" and "unincorporated" territories of the United States. Id.
at 449. These cases represent a response to the problems which "arose from the
territorial acquisitions by the United States after the Treaty of Paris in 1899 follow-
ing the Spanish-American War." Smith, 375 F.2d at 717. These cases became
known as the Insular Cases. Van Dyke, supra note 182, at 449 (citing DeLima v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Arm-
strong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901)). Another distinction made between territories involves "organized" and
"unorganized" territories. Id. at 450.
"An 'organized' territory is one that has established a civil government under
an organic act passed by Congress." Id. at 450. Basically, a territory does not be-
come "incorporated" until Congress consents to its incorporation. Id. at 449. In-
corporation, therefore, represents an important step on the road to statehood. Id.
The Virgin Islands became an "organized territory" by 1936, when Congress
adopted the Organic Act for the Virgin Islands. Smith, 375 F.2d at 719; see also Van
Dyke, supra note 182, at 494-99 (discussing historical treatment of Virgin Islands).
Congress amended this 1936 Act in 1954, when "Congress made it clear that
although it was providing a detailed frame of government for the Islands this was
not to be taken as an indication that it had destined the territory for statehood."
Smith, 375 F.2d at 718. The Virgin Islands, therefore, do not constitute an "incor-
porated" territory. Id. For a more complete discussion of these distinctions, see
generally ARNOLD L. LEIBowrrz, DEFINING STATUS 10-16 (1989); Frederic K
Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 26 COLUM. L. REv.
823 (1926); Van Dyke, supra note 37, at 448-71.
Although not crucial to our analysis of the border search exception, a practi-
tioner should note this classification in analyzing judicial treatment of the United
States/Virgin Islands border (US/VI border).
185. Van Dyke, supra note 182, at 447 (stating that "the U.S. Virgin Is-
lands[ ]may never become (a] state[ ] because of [its] unique culture[ ], [its]
small size, and [its] distance from the U.S. mainland, but [it] deserves a greater
stature than is provided by the concept of 'territory' under U.S. law").
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treatment by Congress, federal agencies and the courts.' 8 6 At least one
commentator has noted that "the Constitution and [United States] laws
have been interpreted and applied to [the Virgin Islands] in a manner
that is different from the way they have been interpreted and applied to
the states of the United States."1 8 7 The Third Circuit has held that "only
the most fundamental constitutional rights extend to [the Virgin Islands]
where Congress is silent on the subject."' 8
Because the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures involves a fundamental constitutional right, courts
must afford such protection to persons living in the Virgin Islands.189 The
question becomes what level of protection exists for those persons who
lawfully enter the Virgin Islands and travel to other areas of the United
States. The answer hinges on the court's definition of the border relation-
ship between the United States and the Virgin Islands. According to the
Hyde court, the border's similarity to a traditional "customs zone" supports
the application of the border searches' rationale. 190 The question arising
from this rationale involves whether the court may expand these searches
to state borders in the future.
2. The Hyde View of the US/VI Border as Applied to State Borders
The Hyde court based its decision that the US/VI border constituted a
"customs zone" on prior opinions evaluating Puerto Rico and the Panama
Canal Zone.' 9 ' Importandy, all three areas pertain to unincorporated ter-
ritories of the United States and therefore, fall within the power of Con-
gress under Article IV, Section 3 of the United States Constitution.1 92
186. Id. The Virgin Islands, along with the other U.S.-Flag Islands, have al-
ways enjoyed a unique legal status under U.S. law, which "occasionally works for
the benefits of the inhabitants of these islands, but it frequently creates hardships
or awkward situations." Id.
187. Id. at 447-48; cf. Smith, 375 F.2d at 717-18 (defining status of Virgin Is-
lands as irrelevant for purposes of constitutional prohibition against special
legislation).
188. Van Dyke, supra note 182, at 499 (quoting Territorial Court of Virgin
Islands v. Richards, 673 F. Supp. 152, 158 (D.V.I. 1987)); see also Territorial Court
of the Virgin Islands v. Richards, 847 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1988) (discussing constitu-
tional rights applicable in Virgin Islands), aff'g United States v. Richards, 673 F.
Supp. 152 (D.V.I. 1987).
189. See, e.g., Torres v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 474
(1979) (noting that although Court has recognized exceptions to warrant require-
ment, it has "not dispensed with the fundamental Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures").
190. United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that
Congress created "customs zone" between United States and Virgin Islands).
191. Hyde, 936 F.3d at 121 (citing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)
(dealing with Puerto Rico) and Kaufman & Sons, Co. v. Smith, 216 U.S. 610, 611
(1910) (dealing with Panama Canal Zone)).
192. This article provides, in pertinent part: "[t]he Congress shall have Power
to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory
... belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
866 [Vol. 40: p. 835
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Because state borders involve different standards than borders between
states and unincorporated territories, the risk that courts will expand the
Hyde rationale to state borders appears minimal.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Challenging a Border Search in the Third Circuit Today
Will the Third Circuit exclude the evidence against your client in the
introductory hypothetical? Probably not. Third Circuit jurisprudence es-
tablishes rules a practitioner must face when attempting to exclude evi-
dence seized from this traveller. First, if the search occurs at an
international border, or the functional equivalent thereof, the court will
conclusively presume the reasonableness of the search.1 9 3 Second, if the
court classifies the search as "routine," the court will most likely admit any
evidence under the border search exception. 19 4 Unfortunately, based on
the broad scope of the exception, the court will virtually ignore any racial
motivation for the search, absence of probable cause supporting the
search and lack of consent to the search by the victim.
The best way to successfully challenge the introduction of the evi-
dence entails establishing that either: (a) the search did not occur at the
border or its functional equivalent; (b) the search involved "non-routine"
or overly intrusive procedures; or (c) the inspectors detained the victim
for an impermissible length of time. 195 The challenger could also argue
that the traditional justifications for the exception do not apply to the
facts of his case. This argument would hinge on the type of evidence
seized and how serious a threat it posed to national security.
B. Future Treatment of the Exception
Under current Supreme Court precedent, it does not appear likely
that the border search exception will extend beyond international borders
to the internal borders between states. 196 However, recent decisions of
the Third Circuit demonstrate an intent to expand the exception as far as
the Supreme Court will permit.1 9 7 This trend leaves the practitioner with
193. Hyde, 37 F.3d at 118-19.
194. United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136, 140 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that
issue involves whether or not court classifies search as "routine").
195. See, e.g., Hyde, 37 F.3d 116 (evaluating concept of what constitutes bor-
der); Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136 (evaluating whether to apply border search exception
to outgoing searches); see also Sharon Alexander, Plane View Doctrine? Private Aircraft
Searches, 55J. AIR L. & CoM. 443, 463 n.117 (Winter 1989) (stating that main con-
troversial issues surrounding border search exception involve "(1) determining
whether a vehicle actually crossed an international border; (2) how long a deten-
tion is permissible; and (3) the scope of the search").
196. For a discussion of the differing treatment given to searches occurring at
internal borders, see supra notes 41-46 & 180-81 and accompanying text.
197. See Hyde, 37 F.3d 116 (expanding border search exception to internal
United States/Virgin Islands border); Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136 (extending excep-
tion to search of outgoing travellers).
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little room to maneuver within the confines of the exception. In short, if
the Third Circuit classifies the search as routine, or if the search occurs at
the border or the functional equivalent thereof, the practitioner will most
likely not have the ability to exclude the seized evidence.
Gregory T. Arnold
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